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Adopting an online ethnographic approach, we examine the linguistic/ semiotic practices and 
ideologies of “purism” among Tatar and Iranian Azerbaijani Facebook users. We argue that 
purification practices can be understood as identity work, the outcome of which is often not an 
etymologically “purer” language but a (perceived) “purer” and more “authentic” identity. We show 
that top-down standardization in Tatar has resulted in more homogenized ideologies regarding “pure” 
language and “authentic” identity, compared to the more heterogeneous ideologies among Iranian 
Azerbaijanis. Furthermore, we argue that since these communities rarely use the written form of their 
languages in off-line contexts, their purification practices are profoundly limited to metapragmatic 
discourses; however, social media provides a unique venue to also exercise these ideologies 
linguistically/semiotically. Finally, unlike previous scholarship that has focused on the informality 
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Linguistic behavior on the Internet is monitored and regulated by various actors bringing along 
different language ideologies. As Leppänen and Peuronen (2012) argue, Internet sites develop certain 
types of regulatory mechanisms that implicitly shape the choice and use of languages. Acts of 
regulating language choice and use are what Blommaert et al. (2009) refer to as “language policing,” 
i.e. “the production of ‘order’—normatively organised and policed conduct—which is infinitely 
detailed and regulated by a variety of actors from the state to individuals, over civil society and 
corporate actors” (p. 203). Since language policing practices on social media are carried out by 
various actors, social media becomes a “complex social space” where extremely heterogeneous and 
homogeneous language ideologies coexist (Phyak, 2015, pp. 379–380). Critical scrutiny of these acts 
can shed light on how heterogeneous language practices influence, for instance, discursive 
construction of national and ethnic identities (Heyd, 2014; Lane, 2009), ideologies about minority 
languages (Wagner, 2011, Sallabank, 2015), or in particular, how social media contributes to shaping 
ideas on language purity and contamination (Cru, 2015; Yazan, 2015). 
This article contributes to the discussion of how social media affects language practices and how 
these practices can reveal broader social, cultural, and political conditions. We investigate the 
linguistic practices and ideologies of “purism” among Iranian Azerbaijani and Tatar users of 
Facebook and argue that the certain similarities and differences between these two bilingual com- 
munities can explain the uniformity and/or diversity of the linguistic practices of their members on 
social media. Despite their similarities regarding, for instance, being ethnolinguistically 
subordinated, these two communities differ from one another in terms of official status, a 
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standardized writing system, and education in and of the language. We argue that these differences 
have led to varying linguistic practices and differing ideologies of purism. In particular, we illustrate 
that while the processes of standardization in Tatar along with its official status have resulted in more 
homogenized ideologies among Tatars, the lack of standard form and official status has led to more 
heterogeneous ideologies among Iranian Azerbaijanis regarding what constitutes ethnolinguistic 
identity and what counts as legitimate language use. 
We also illustrate that social media provides a unique venue for the practices of linguistic purism 
in these two communities. Specifically, we argue that while ideas of “pure” Azerbaijani and Tatar 
are mostly restricted to metapragmatic discourses—i.e., explicit comments on language use—outside 
of the Internet/social media, social media platforms, like Facebook, give the members of these 
communities the opportunity to practice purist ideologies not only metapragmatically but also 
linguistically and semiotically. This is because, outside of social media, the speakers of these 
languages rarely have the chance to use their languages in the written form, since the majority 
languages, i.e., Persian and Russian, are used in most formal institutional and educational settings. 
Social media, then, allows these minoritized language users to exercise the written form of their 
native languages, and since for some of them written language entails formality, they attempt to write 
in what they perceive to be formal language. While previous scholarship has mostly focused on the 
informality of language use on social media, we illustrate how social media turns out to be a platform 
for these users to practice formal language, given the social and political circumstances around them 
in Iran and Russia. 
We will provide an overview of (1) linguistic purism and our theoretical and analytical approach 
to it; and (2) the sociopolitical issues surrounding the communities under study. After the methods 
section, we will analyze these communities’ linguistic/semiotic practices as well as metapragmatic 
discourses of purism found on Facebook, concluding with the main contributions of the study. 
 
LINGUISTIC PURIFICATION AS IDENTITY WORK 
 
Previous scholarship has provided different definitions and overviews of the notion of “linguistic 
purity” and has outlined the key metalinguistic motivations and principal concerns with respect to 
acts of purification (Allan & Burridge, 2006, pp. 112–124; Langer & Nesse, 2012; Walsh, 2016, pp. 
7–34). In this article, we take Brunstad’s (2003) broader definition of linguistic purism as a language 
planning ideology that involves resistance to foreign elements—an act by a part of a speech 
community to “preserve a language form” or to get rid of “putative foreign elements or other elements 
held to be undesirable” (p. 52). The prescriptive nature of acts of purification (Lodge, 1993; Thomas, 
1991) makes these acts relevant to processes of standardization, in which certain linguistic forms 
(e.g., lexical items, orthography, and phonology) as well as certain ways of speaking and writing are 
prescribed as standard, in pursuit of national and cultural cohesion. As Brunstad (2003) argues, 
linguistic purification ideology is “always present in the standard language” (p. 53), which means 
that a researcher’s task is not to attest to the presence of this ideology in a given language but rather 
to compare differences in intensity, impact, orientation, and typology of purism across languages. 
It is reasonable to see the purification movement as part of general ideologies promoting social 
opposites, such as “us” versus “them” and “correct” versus “incorrect” (Brunstad, 2003, p. 57). The 
“pure” language becomes one of identity markers, part of a feature cluster that includes descent, 
history, culture, and religion that secure belonging to a certain ethnic community. Thus, language is 
an integral part of collective identities, and social networks contribute to the construction and/or 
negotiation of such identities. Similarly, we regard the purification practices and ideologies to be 
fundamentally related to identity; therefore, we find Bucholtz and Hall’s (2004a, 2004b, 2005)  
framework for the linguistic analysis of identities a useful tool for understanding these practices. 
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Bucholtz and Hall (2004a, 2004b, 2005) consider identity as an outcome of culture rather than a 
source of it; therefore, language, as a type of cultural production, plays a crucial role in identity 
construction. The identity is shaped within relevant sociopolitical relations, which, they argue, are 
not static but instead dynamically constructed through semiotic processes. The authors propose three 
pairs of tactics that establish these relations: adequation and distinction, authentication and 
denaturalization, and authorization and illegitimation. According to Bucholtz and Hall (2004a, 
p.384), adequation pertains to situational establishment of sameness or likeness and deemphasis of 
potential differences; whereas distinction, conversely, deals with acts of differentiation by making 
the differences situationally more salient and similarities less salient. Authentication emphasizes the 
role of agency in the production and negotiation of the ideas of what counts as a “real” identity. In 
contrast, denaturalization is a process through which some identities are claimed to be “artificial” 
and “unreal.” Finally, authorization and illegitimation “involve the attempt to legitimate an identity 
through an institutional or other authority, or conversely the effort to withhold or withdraw such 
structural power” (Bucholz & Hall, 2004a, p. 386). 
In this article, we illustrate how linguistic purification is, in essence, an act of authenticating 
ethnonationalist and ethnolinguistic identities. This authentication process primarily involves 
denaturalization of the identity associated with the language that is contaminated by foreign 
elements. The “foreignness” of these elements, however, is a sociopolitical construct rather than a 
result of linguistic differences. That is, the linguistic practices of purification often involve replacing 
the linguistic features associated with the language(s) of “them” with the features associated with the 
language(s) of “us.” Such associations indeed are ideologically rendered as inherent links between 
certain linguistic features and certain national or ethnic identities, in a process Irvine and Gal (2000, 
p. 37) refer to as “iconization.” The outcome of these processes is often not an etymologically “purer” 
language, but instead, is the perception of a “purer” and more “authentic” identity. The authenticity 
of the identities constructed through these linguistic practices as well as the authority claimed by 
using such “pure” language, as we shall see, may not always be approved of by other group members 




Volga Tatars, numbering some six million across the Russian Federation, are one of the country’s 
largest ethnic minorities, mainly concentrated in the Republic of Tatarstan. The constitution of 1992 
allowed for both Russian and Tatar to be state languages in all spheres of language use within the 
republic. Despite this regulation, there is still a profound asymmetry in the representation of these 
languages in functional domains: The use of the titular Tatar language is often considered as “marked,” 
limited, and “particularized,” especially in the public domain, whereas Russian is the “normal,” 
“unmarked” language that can be used in all spheres (Wertheim, 2003, p. 348). 
Immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Tatarstani authorities undertook some language 
planning programs to ensure that Tatar was on equal footing with Russian. We can observe acts of 
authorization, i.e., legitimation of “certain social identities as culturally intelligible” (Bucholtz & Hall, 
2004b, p. 503) in the enactment of the laws on education in the 1990s. The new legislation declared 
Tatar language learning a compulsory subject for all nationalities in secondary schools of the republic. 
Despite the initial success, the language revival policy toward the titular language in Tatarstan was 
unable to change the language practices and overcome the ongoing language shift toward Russian 
(Gorenburg, 2005; Nizamova, 2016; Zamyatin, 2012). Moreover, it resulted in a “latent discontent” 




The existing asymmetrical bilingualism in Tatarstan is such that in 2010 about 89% of Tatars spoke 
both state languages of the republic (often the proficiency in Russian is significantly higher than in the 
native language), whereas only about 10% of Russians speak Tatar. The titular language remains a 
dominant language of communication in Tatar-populated rural districts; however, a growing number of 
urban Tatars prefer to use Russian in communication at work and within family circles (Khodzhaeva, 
2016). Russian is considered to be a more functional language, whereas Tatar is seen as having a mere 
symbolic function in transmitting ethnicity. The situation is aggrandized by the decreasing number of 
schools that provide teaching of native languages as a medium of instruction and a subject. Tatar 
nationalist groups argue that throughout the campaign for “optimization” launched by the Russian 
government in 2001, more than 690 Tatar schools were closed (Ivakina, 2017; Zamyatin, 2012, p. 94). 
From 2014 to 2016, the government of Tatarstan ran a program to “preserve Tatar national identity,” 
which aimed also to increase the prestige of Tatar language through establishing various educational 
and research programs, supporting financially Tatar media channels and festivals, among other methods 
(Ministerstvo, 2017). These macrolevel language prestige planning goals were complimented by various 
grassroots initiatives on the micro level. For instance, the Kazan branch of the World Forum of Tatar 
Youth (TatForum) has been organizing activities that contribute to the equal representation of Tatar and 
Russian in public spaces in Tatarstan. They request availability of any public information (including 
signboards and announcements on public transportation) in both state languages, organize the annual 
festival “Min Tatarcha söyläshäm” [I speak Tatar] and launch projects in translation of popular world 
literature, e.g., the books about Harry Potter by J. K. Rowling, into Tatar (Inde, 2016). Thus, these 
microlevel initiatives complement macro language planning methods to enhance the prestige and 
promote acquisition of Tatar (Baldauf, 2006, p. 165). 
 
Azerbaijanis in Iran 
Except for the very old, uneducated generations, the majority of the people in Azerbaijani-speaking 
regions in Iran are bilingual speakers of Azerbaijani and Persian (Karimzad, 2016). Persian is the only 
official language in Iran and is used in education, mass media, and administration. Although the 
constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran does not forbid the use of minority languages, the emphasis 
on Persian as the only official language has had significant consequences for the minoritized languages, 
including Azerbaijani. In particular, the lack of official status restricts the use of Azerbaijani only to 
informal domains (Bani-Shoraka, 2005). As a result, it has not been standardized and does not have a 
standard writing system. In fact, Iranian Azerbaijanis rarely have the opportunity to use formal forms 
of their language, especially its written form (Karimzad, 2018). Moreover, Iranian Azerbaijanis do not 
receive education in their mother tongue since the medium of instruction is Persian, nor do they have 
the chance to receive education of their language. 
In addition, Iranian Azerbaijanis have historically been subjected to ethnolinguistic subordination. 
On the one hand, Azeri-accented Persian has been an object of mockery among non-Azerbaijanis, 
especially the Persian-speaking majority. On the other hand, Azerbaijanis are depicted as “less 
intelligent” and “foolish” in some of the Iranian cultural productions such as jokes—a social stereotype 
that has been reproduced in non-Azerbaijanis’ everyday interactions (Karimzad, 2018). 
Lack of education in and of the language as well as the historical subordination has led different 
actors to make efforts to maintain Azerbaijani language and revitalize Azerbaijani identity. However, 
the dominant Persian majority and the Islamic regime of Iran associate any discussion related to 
Azerbaijani language and its promotion with Pan-Turkic, separatist ideologies, which are said to 
jeopardize the unity of the nation. Such politicization, as Karimzad (2018) argues, does not allow 
alternative discourses in this regard to gain power and subsequently strengthens Azerbaijani nationalist 
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ideologies as the only authority that can define Azerbaijani identity and police Azerbaijani language 
practices. On the other hand, in recent years the Iranian Azerbaijanis’ tendency to watch satellite TV 
programs broadcast from Turkey and the Republic of Azerbaijan has increased (Bani-Shoraka, 2005; 
Karimzad, 2018; Mirvahedi, 2012). The fact that, unlike Iranian Azerbaijani, the varieties of Turkic 
language spoken in these two countries are standardized and have official status under the control of a 
nation-state has created the idea that their varieties are “purer” and “less contaminated” than Iranian 
Azerbaijani (Karimzad, 2018). These social, cultural, and political conditions have resulted in the 
emergence of diverse ideologies among Azerbaijanis regarding what their mother tongue is, how it 
should be used, and what constitutes Azerbaijani identity. These heterogeneous ideologies are evident 




This study is part of two larger ethnographic studies done by the first and second authors focusing on 
Iranian Azerbaijani and Tatar communities respectively. In this particular study, our approach is that of 
virtual or Internet ethnography (Androutsopoulos, 2006; Hine, 2000; Lenihan, 2011), which is 
complemented by our broader offline ethnographic observations as well as our perspective as members 
of the respective communities. Online ethnography allows us to study virtual environments in a 
nonparticipatory manner as a “lurker,” i.e., “someone who reads messages posed to a public forum” but 
“does not respond to the group” (Hine, 2000, p. 106). We specifically use Androutsopoulos’s (2008) 
Discourse-Centered Online Ethnography (DCOE) tool, which is devised for language-focused research 
on computer-mediated communication (CMC). This approach combines systematic observation of 
selected Web pages, collection of relevant data, and their analysis and interpretation with an aim “to 
illuminate relations between digital texts and their production and reception practices” 
(Androutsopoulos, 2008, p. 2). Given our focus, the relevant data for this study are those examples that 
illustrate the practices of purification. Therefore, it should be noted that we are not arguing that these 
practices generally occur among the members of these communities; instead, our goal is to show the 
processes through which linguistic purification is achieved and how they can be accounted for. In fact, 
these practices are only common among a minority of the members of these communities, but given 
the ideological power behind notions of monolingualism and linguistic purity (Karimzad & Catedral, 
2017), they are the most vocal community members who claim sole authority to define legitimate 
language practices. 
The initial stage of page selection and data collection was carried out based on the authors’ personal 
contacts. That is, we started with the users who, given our familiarity, were identified as those who 
would be involved in explicit discussions about language and ethnic identity and/or would use certain 
“purified,” marked linguistic forms. Tracing these users’ activities helped us find other users, public 
pages/groups with similar linguistic and metapragmatic practices, which in turn linked us to more users 
and/or pages. At the end of this procedure, we had identified over 50 individual or public Facebook 
pages. Then we focused on a variety of activities these users were involved in, such as status updates, 
wall posts, and comments and replies. All of these Facebook users were Tatar-Russian and Azeri-
Persian bilinguals living in Tatarstan and Azerbaijani-speaking regions in Iran respectively. Some 
participants were frequent posters and updated their pages at least a few times a week, while others did 
not show any activity on their pages for a week or even longer. The non-participatory observations were 
carried out for eight months (July 2015–March 2016), and over 80 Facebook activity instances were 
collected. The collected data were used for subsequent linguistic analyses. 
We focused on two types of data: linguistic/semiotic practices and metapragmatic discourses. 
Specifically, we investigated how Azerbaijanis and Tatars Facebook users’ explicit comments on 
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language use reveal their language ideologies and how these ideologies are linguistically/semiotically 
practiced. We looked at the instances of purification at different levels of linguistic features, from 
lexical items to orthography. Given our broader ethnographic observations as well as our perspective 
as members of the communities, in the cases when certain marked linguistic forms were used instead 
of the more common and unmarked forms, we tried to determine the motivational and ideological 
factors behind them. In particular, in any given linguistic instance of purification, we investigated the 
features that were considered foreign, the features they were replaced with, and the potential 




Linguistic/semiotic practices of purification 
Tatar 
Wertheim (2002, 2003) argues that one of the main drives for the Tatar purification movement is the 
fear of assimilation into Russian society. Thus, Tatar identity, as constructed through linguistic 
performance, is primarily defined through opposition to Russian language and culture, equating its 
survival with de-Russification (Wertheim, 2002). Russian language elements are recognized as 
“undesirable” and “foreign and in need of replacement.” In other words, “pure” Tatar must be “spoken 
in any domain and in any register, without any salient Russian interference” (Wertheim, 2002, p. 15). 
Speakers of “pure” Tatar adequate themselves with other Turkic-speaking peoples by creating indexical 
links between linguistic features of other Turkic languages—e.g., lexical items and orthography—with 
a perceived unified “Turkic” identity. 
 
Lexical items. As part of the attempt to return to “roots” and revitalize Tatar language and identity, the 
use of Russian words or words of European origin adopted via Russian has been disapproved of among 
contemporary Tatar speakers. In particular, such de-Russification of Tatar has occurred in three ways: 
(1) returning to the Arabic or Persian loanwords that were used until the 1930s; (2) finding a relic form 
used before or contemporaneously with a loanword; and (3) coining new terminology using the native 
Turko-Tatar stock (Wertheim, 2002, pp. 18–19). On social media, the de-Russification ideology is 
revealed in the style and word choice of individual posts. The Tatar Facebook community generally 
follows the unspoken rule: If a post is in Tatar language, it should not be “contaminated” by Russian 
words; whereas English loanwords (in original orthography or transliterated) are tolerated. 
In particular, Tatar users of social media tend to purify the lexical items that describe recent 
scientific and technological advancements. Often in such cases, there already exists a Russian term 
that is common among Tatars. However, the purists prefer to coin new terms or translate the 
existing Russian variants into Tatar. For instance, the Tatar equivalent for the English term “push-
notification” used by Facebook users is push-belderü. This compound word consists of the English 
word “push” and the word of Turkic origin belderü, meaning “announcement or notification.” In 
many cases, new terms in Tatar are literal, word-for-word translations from Russian. Consider the 
recently introduced Tatar word törü meaning “minimize” (e.g., a browser window). Semantically, 
its meaning is close to the commonly used Russian word svernut’, as the roots of both of them 
have the meaning “to convolve,” which is not implied in the meaning of the English word. 
Moreover, Facebook discussions on acute topics of this century, such as climate change, encourage 
users to (re)introduce certain concepts into Tatar. For instance, the word “environment” in Tatar is tirä-
yak mokhite. This compound noun can serve as an example of the word-for-word translation from 
Russian okruzhaiushchaia sreda (literally meaning “surrounding space”). By using the Turkic word 
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tirä-yak, meaning “surrounding,” and mokhit derived from the Arabic muḥīṭ for “natural space,” these 
Tatars attempt to get rid of Russian influence on their language and hence “purify” it. 
These examples show that the purification of lexical items in the Tatar Facebook community is a 
process aimed to replace Russian terms, preferably by Turkic or Arabic equivalents, to create an identity 
different from “Russianness.” In fact, while Russian words are disapproved of and attempted to be 
removed in “pure” Tatar, English and Arabic words are still tolerated, providing evidence that it is not 
the etymological purity of the language that is of concern for the purists, but instead, it is a matter of 
purifying the language from the elements associated with the language of “them.” That is, such practices 
of de-Russification help authenticate a “purer” ethnolinguistic identity. 
 
Orthography. Purification on the level of orthography deals mainly with the Tatar phones that are not 
found in Russian language. As part of the Soviet policies, Tatar language script was changed from 
Arabic to Latin in 1926 and later to Cyrillic in 1938. To reflect the sounds that were missing in Russian, 
special symbols were added to both Latin and Cyrillic alphabets. Today, Tatars use the Cyrillic-based 
Russian alphabet with six additional symbols, which are not found in Russian: for three vowels—ə/æ/, 
ү/ʏ/, ө/ö/—and three consonants—ң/ŋ/, h/h/, җ/dʒ/(Wertheim, 2002, p. 14). In CMC, these additional 
symbols are often omitted, and the standard Russian alphabet is used instead. The purists, however, 
insist that the additional symbols be used on social media. Example (1), drawn from a discussion thread 
on Facebook, illustrates how significant the use of these symbols is for those who want to write in 
“pure” Tatar. In this example, the users discuss the necessity of installing a special keyboard to input 
the Tatar characters missing in the standard Russian keyboard. User A complains that nobody has 
invented a proper Tatar keyboard for his/her type of mobile device yet, implying that writing in the 
correct Tatar orthography takes too much time and effort. In doing so, s/he does not use special symbols 
but switches to Russian several times within a sentence. User B, on the other hand, gives a short but 
orthographically “correct” answer in Tatar, saying that “a normal keyboard,” which User A is asking 
for, will be necessary only for lazy people. User A disagrees with this idea, saying that s/he sees no 
connection between diligence and the long pressing of special keys; at the same time the user switches 
to more “sophisticated” Tatar in her/his response and “purifies” it from Russian words but keeps the 
previously used “incorrect” orthography as a strategy to disalign with User B. (The “incorrect” symbols 
are underlined.) 
(1) A: Vot chto meshaet tatarcha normal’nyi klaviatura eshlerge, chtob berkaya da ozagrak basyp 
torasy bulmasyn? 
B: yalkaular öchen 
A: Eie, elbette, kem nichek kure bit inde, eshchenleknen khereflerge berem-berem basuda 
agylganyn belmi idem:) 
A: ‘What stops [RUS] them from inventing a normal [RUS] Tatar keyboard [RUS], so [RUS] 
one does not have to keep buttons pressed longer?’ [There is a wrong agreement in gender and 
case in the phrase “normal keyboard”: The adjective should be in Fem. Acc. instead of Masc. 
Nom.] 
B: ‘For those who are lazy.’ 
A: ‘Yes, of course, everyone sees it differently, but I did not know that diligence manifests 
itself in pressing letters one by one [smile emoticon].’ 
This example shows that Tatar purists insist on using the special symbols in the Cyrillic alphabet, in 
pursuit of promoting what is perceived as “correct” Tatar language. Consequently, users who ignore 
these special symbols are regarded as “lazy” and “disrespectful” toward their mother tongue, since they 
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do not try to keep the language “clean” and “pure.” 
Another remarkable linguistic practice in the Tatar Facebook community is the intentional 
misspellings of the Russian words. Such examples are marked because they often occur in the posts of 
active members of the Tatar community, who are known as the main promoters of the “ pure” Tatar and 
have enough educational background to avoid such mistakes. The mistakes are quite specific and reflect 
a speech pattern typical for Tatar village speakers, who have less language contact with Russians. Some 
practices stretch beyond the orthographic level and may involve morphological and grammatical 
changes. 
(2) Singa turï kilgän fotolar mure. 
‘There is a sea [plenty] of pictures that will fit to [what you are looking for]’. 
(3) Bolay yazarga da yaramïydïr inde, nepatriotishchnorak. 
 ‘probably it should not be written like this, [it is somehow] unpatriotic’. 
 
In example (2), the user misspells the Russian word for “sea,” reflecting the pronunciation of the 
word by a nonnative speaker. This orthographic “mistake” occurs in an accented syllable, which is 
phonotactically impossible in the utterance of a native Russian speaker. However, the replacement of 
the sound/o/by/u/in Russian words by Tatar language speakers is a frequent case and therefore is 
recognizable for other Tatars. Similarly, example (3) shows that the Russian adverb nepatriotichno for 
“unpatriotic” in the sentence in Tatar is also misspelled, reflecting the phonetic adaptation of the sound 
/tʃ/ in Russian, which some Tatars have difficulty pronouncing. The user also adds a Tatar suffix –rak 
to the Russian word, which signals the comparative form of the adverb in Tatar and makes the word fit 
into a Tatar speech. The phonological and morphological adaptations of this kind are typical for people 
from rural areas who often grow up in a monolingual Tatar setting and receive their secondary education 
exclusively in Tatar. Their usually lower levels of proficiency in Russian also impede further specialized 
education and, consequently, social mobility (Mukhariamova, Morenko, Petrova, & Salakhatdinova, 
2004, p. 61). The fact that these elements occur in the speech of a highly educated urban Tatar speaker 
marks them as a deliberate sociolinguistic move, which shows the aspiration of the speaker to 
differentiate him/herself from Russianness. 
These acts aim to authenticate the language practices of Tatar village inhabitants, i.e., older 
generations, indexing that their language is “purer” than the language of the contemporary Tatar youth. 
By transforming a Russian word in a way that it resembles the speech of a Tatar villager, the purists 
show their awareness of the fact that their posts in Tatar contain “unnatural” (Russian) elements, thereby 
trying to “dissimilate” themselves from Russianness. 
 
Azerbaijani 
The language policing practices in Azerbaijani are motivated by two main ideologies: “correctness” and 
“pureness” ideologies (Karimzad, 2018). Both of these ideologies have “the ideal monolingual speaker” 
at their core. The “correctness” ideology mainly favors speaking as monolingually as possible and also 
considers diachronic and synchronic changes that the language has gone/is going through as “harmful” 
to the language. As a result, the proponents of “correctness” ideology make analogies with other Turkic 
languages to find and use the “correct” linguistic forms. On the other hand, the “pureness” ideology, 
which entails the first ideology as well, concerns the process of differentiating Azerbaijani identity from 
that of Persians, i.e., de-Persianization of the Azerbaijani language and identity. The “pureness” 
ideology is favored by the nationalist separatists who prefer a more “Turkic identity” as opposed to an 
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Iranian Azerbaijani identity, while the “correctness” ideology is less about differentiating from Iranian 
identity and adequating with other Turkic groups and more about using the perceived correct forms of 
the language. 
 
Lexical items. Replacement of lexical items is the most common way of purifying the language among 
Azerbaijani purists. The benchmark for deciding what words should be replaced is whether or not they 
are associated with Persian. What they should be replaced with, in turn, is determined by whether or not 
the alternative word is associated with a Turkic language, usually Turkish and/or North Azerbaijani. 
The main purpose of these purification practices is highlighting their differences with Persians and 
adequating with other Turkic groups. 
Let us now look at examples of how the Azerbaijani words for “photo/picture” are replaced. The 
commonly used lexical item for “photo/picture” in the Azerbaijani spoken in Iran is æhs (also ækis/ 
ækiz in some dialects). The word æhs is borrowed from the Persian word æks < سکع >, which 
etymologically comes from the Arabic ʿakasa’ < سَکَع  > meaning “to reverse/reflect/mirror.” This word 
is phonologically nativized in Azerbaijani to comply with the phonotactics of the language and avoid 
the/ks/consonant cluster. In the following examples, we will see how this word is replaced by 
presumably more “Turkic” words. 
(4) Videolar və şəkillər 
‘videos and pictures’ 
(5) Sağ ol. bu arxiv fotolar məndə yoxdur 
‘Thank you. I don’t have these archived photos’ 
 
Example (4) is taken from the name of a Facebook page that shares videos and pictures mostly 
related to Azerbaijani music and culture. As illustrated, the word şəkil, a common North Azerbaijani 
word meaning “image, picture” is used instead of the more common Iranian Azerbaijani word æhs. 
Etymologically, this word comes from the Arabic word šakl < لْكَش >, which means “shape, form.” Taking 
into account the facts that (1) the word æks also exists in North Azerbaijani but might be less common; 
and (2) etymologically both lexical items have Arabic roots, we can see that the underlying motivation 
for such linguistic practices is to replace the words that are associated with Persian with those associated 
with North Azerbaijani. Example (5), on the other hand, is a comment under a Facebook post 
concerning a series of old pictures of Tabriz, the largest Azerbaijani-speaking city in Iran. In this 
example, the North Azerbaijani foto, which is taken from the English word photo(graph), is used instead 
of æhs. Similarly, it is its association with North Azerbaijani that makes this word sound more “Turkic” 
and hence more “authentic,” while the naturally nativized word æhs would reveal the influence of 
Persian on the Azerbaijani spoken in Iran and thus index “inauthenticity” and “impurity.” 
Such practices of purification can be best understood in terms of the processes of distinction and 
adequation. That is, in order for these purists to differentiate themselves from “Persianness” and 
highlight their similarities with other Turkic groups, they opt to replace the words associated with 
Persian with the ones that are associated with other Turkic languages, especially Turkish and North 395 
Azerbaijani. Given the fact that, due to the sociopolitical history of the region, not only Iranian 
Azerbaijani and Persian but also Turkish and North Azerbaijani have been influenced by Arabic, it is 
evident that such purification is achieved through the social associations of the linguistic features with 
“us” and “them” and not from a (nonsocial) linguistic perspective. Hence, these acts of de-
Persianization, as we saw, may not lead to an etymologically pure Azerbaijani, but they help the 400 




Orthography. The Azerbaijani spoken in Iran does not have a standard written form, and as a result, 
there is no consensus among Azerbaijanis on how it should be written. In fact, prior to the emergence 
of CMC, Azerbaijanis in Iran did not have the chance to practice the written version of their language, 
since Persian, as the only official language of Iran, has been used in institutional and 405 educational 
contexts. When text-based communications such as text messaging or instant messaging became 
popular, Azerbaijanis found the opportunity to write in their language. At first, they started to use the 
English alphabet to write in Azerbaijani. Although the English alphabet lacks many different sounds 
that exist in Azerbaijani, such as/y/,/œ/, and/ɯ/, Azerbaijani CMC users have developed shared sets of 
conventions for written communication. This is still the most common 410 and least monitored way of 
writing on social media among younger generations of Azerbaijanis. 
The use of Persian/Arabic script or the North Azerbaijani/Turkish alphabet are the other common 
orthographies for the Iranian Azerbaijani. The former is usually associated with those who do not 
distance themselves from their Iranian identity but still consider monolingualism as the ideal, and the 
latter is associated more with purist, nationalist ideologies. Understanding what these orthographic 
choices index; however, is relatively less straightforward. To determine what these 415 orthographic 
choices index, we also need to look at the other linguistic practices, such as lexical and/or 
morphosyntactic structure choices. 
 
و … ید زکرمتم هد نوتسوا نیرل یزیر ھمانرب ، ریید زکرمتم هدنوتسوا نیلدمآرد یزای وب تلم اباب (6)  
راو یشیخاب زنط ریب افرص  
‘People! The focus of this note is not on the income, it is focused on their planning… . It is just 
having a sarcastic view.’ 
ادنیھاگآدوخان نینیزای وب اما ،لیید ادناملآ زوس مریلیب هدنم .ھلیچئس زود رالاثم کرگ ..اسلوا هد زنط فدھ (7)   
راو رللکشم  
‘Even if the goal is being sarcastic, the examples should be chosen correctly. I also know that the 
focus is not Germany, but this note is subconsciously problematic.’ 
 
Examples (6) and (7) are taken from a thread of comments under a Facebook post sarcastically 
comparing the average income and expenses in Iran and Germany, hinting at how difficult it is to make 
ends meet in Iran. Some Facebook users challenge the validity of the numbers given in this note 
regarding the average income in Germany. Example (6) is a response by the user who has shared this 
joke, clarifying what s/he thinks its focus is. Looking at his/her orthographic choice, which is 
Arabic/Persian script, and lexical choices, for example dæra:mæd < دمآرد > [income], motæmærkez  
زکرمتم > > [concentrated], bærnamerizi < یزیر ھمانرب > [planning], and tænz < زنط > [sarcasm], which are 
Persian or Arabic words borrowed from Persian, we realize that, while s/he opts for Arabic/Persian 
script, the linguistic practices of this user are not of a purist nature. Example (7) is a response to the 
comment made by the Facebook user in example (6). Interestingly, the user responding to this comment, 
who was using the North Azerbaijani alphabet in his previous comment in this thread, aligns with the 
orthography preferred by the other user. This is, we argue, a move to establish solidarity and focus more 
on the content of the message than the differences in the writing forms. However, taking some of his 
lexical choices, especially gæræk < کرگ > meaning “should” and dæyil < لیید > meaning “is not,” into 
account, we can notice the differences in their language use. In the Azerbaijani variety spoken by these 
users, /k/ changes to /h/ in word final positions. Since the phonotactics of the language does not 
allow/k/in word final positions, gæræk has been established as gæræh in this variety. Also, given that 
the similarities in the articulatory properties of /l/ and /r/, dæyil < لیید >, which is the common 
pronunciation in North Azerbaijani (in Turkish, it is değil), have historically been reanalyzed as dæyir 
< ریید >, which is what the user in example (6) uses as the common word in this variety. The ideology 
motivating the linguistic practices we observe in example (7) can be said to be less about “purity” and 
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more about “correctness” (Karimzad, 2018). That is, unlike the purists, such language users are less 
concerned about getting rid of Persian influence—as the person in example (7) uses the Persian 
borrowed words such as naxodagah < هاگآدوخان > [subconscious]—but focus more on (1) speaking as 
monolingually as possible and (2) making sure that synchronic and diachronic changes do not “harm” 
the language. The idea of what the “correct” forms are is usually motivated through analogical analysis 
of the linguistic forms in their own language with their counterparts in other Turkic languages, 
especially North Azerbaijani and Turkish (Karimzad, 2018). 
Let us now look at example (8) and revisit one of the examples from the previous section, which is 
repeated here for convenience. 
 
لیید دییاع هزیب وتنوروگ وب (8)   
‘This picture doesn’t belong to us’ 
 
(9) Sağ ol. bu arxiv fotolar məndə yoxdur 
‘Thank you. I don’t have these archived photos.’ 
 
Even though two different orthographic forms are used in examples (8) and (9), they both illustrate 
purist linguistic practices. Example (8) is a response to a comment criticizing a picture shared by a page. 
The picture includes an Azerbaijani poem, which is written in the spoken form. The administrator of 
the page is trying to avoid responsibility for the text used in this picture and explains that s/he only 
approves of the meaning of the poem. In doing so, s/he uses Persian/Arabic orthography. However, 
looking at the lexical and morphosyntactic choices, we can see the purist attempts by this user. First of 
all, the word görüntü < وتنوروگ > used by this user instead of æhs, meaning “picture,” does not exist in 
the Azerbaijani used in Iran. Even in Turkish, with which it is associated, this word is not very common, 
and if ever used, it refers more to a “view” rather than a “picture.” Moreover, the North Azerbaijani aid 
dæyil (or Turkish ait değil) meaning “not belong” is another structure that is not common in the 
Azerbaijani spoken in Iran. The Azerbaijanis in Iran use rajeʔ < عجار >, i.e., rajeʔ dæyir (or dæyil in some 
dialects), instead of aid < دییاع >. Interestingly, both of these words come from Arabic roots, rajaʿa < َ عَجَر > 
and (ʿ-w-d) < د و ع > respectively, meaning “to return.” However, it is the association of rajeʔ with 
Persian and aid with North Azerbaijani and/or Turkish that leads to the avoidance of the former and its 
replacement with the latter. Example (9), on the other hand, illustrates the purist practices using the 
North Azerbaijani alphabet. Besides the use of foto instead of the more common Azeri words, which 
were discussed in the previous section, the choice of arxiv meaning “archive” is also interesting. In the 
Azerbaijani spoken in Iran, the common word for “archive” is arshiv, which is shared with Persian and 
Turkish. This demonstrates how, in fact, it is not the etymological Turkicness that the purists are 
concerned with; instead, it is about differentiating themselves from Persianness/Iranianness by 
attempting to avoid any linguistic features associated/shared with Persian. 
The examples we looked at here reveal that the linguistic/semiotic practices of the members of the 
Azerbaijani community on social media are motivated by a continuum of ideologies from writing as 
they naturally speak to monolingual and “correct” language use and finally to “pure” and more 
“authentic” use of language (Karimzad, 2018). We illustrated that, although different orthographic 
choices might be associated with different ideologies, understanding their indexical functions requires 







METAPRAGMATIC DISCOURSES OF PURISM 
 
Tatar 
“Only villagers speak pure Tatar.”. As mentioned in the part on orthography, there is an ideology in 
the Tatar Facebook community that presents the language of rural area inhabitants as the example of 
“pure” Tatar. Such a discourse aims to transform the popular perception among Tatar youth dating back 
to late 1990s, which associated speaking Tatar with rural, poorly educated Tatars coming to big 
industrial cities of the republic to try their luck. The common assumption was that these settlers would 
speak Tatar because they simply had no or too little knowledge of Russian to communicate in it fluently. 
This popular perception, however, has drastically changed since the 2000s. In fact, the “villagers’ 
language” has been promoted as an example of “correct” and “pure” Tatar. In example (10), a user, 
who appears to live in a city, expressed his/her fascination by listening to “the village language” on a 
radio station, which s/he describes as “pure” (saf), “correct” (tözek), and “perfect” (kamil): 
 
(10) Häm berzaman 67,79 dulkïnïnnan saf tatar tele agïla… . Shähär bulïp shähärdä „avïl telendä“ 
cöylilär! Radiodan! Tapshïrularï saf tatar telendä, jïrlarï—tatarcha, alïp baralar matur itep, tel 
tözek, chista, kamil—ürnäk ölgese! 
 
‘And all of a sudden on the 67,79 radio station a pure Tatar starts to flow… . Even in a city [people] 
speak the “village language”! On the radio! The programs are in pure Tatar language, songs are in 
Tatar,[the presenters] speak beautifully, the language is correct, clean, perfect—[it is] an example 
to follow!’ 
 
This example points to the ideology present among Tatar Facebook users that “pure” Tatar language 
has been maintained in rural areas and especially among elderly speakers. The reason for such an 
assumption is that many village inhabitants have less contact with Russian language and are proficient 
only in Tatar, which have refrained their language from “contaminations.” 
 
Mankurtism. Another prominent topic around Tatar language and ideology is “mankurtism.” The term 
gained a wide usage across the post-Soviet space after the publication of Chingiz Aitmatov’s book, The 
Day Lasts More Than a 100 Years. Aitmatov narrates a Kyrgyz legend of a war prisoner, who turned 
into a mankurt—an unthinking slave, and was unable to recognize his own mother. In contemporary 
Tatar discourse, the term refers to those members of the community who have abandoned or have never 
embraced their heritage culture and the elements of Tatar identity. 
Example (11) is taken from a thread of comments under a video posted on Facebook, in which a 
Tatar politician was delivering a speech in Russian in the State Council of the Republic. The Facebook 
users involved in this thread are criticizing this politician for using Russian and not his native language 
while addressing the audience. A user sees it as a sign of mankurtism, arguing that Tatar officials have 
become slaves of the Russian governmental system and are not able to speak their native language 
anymore: 
 
(11) Mankortlar … Kollïk psikhologiyäse tatar türäsenä ber yabïshsa, anï tiz genä kubarïp alïp bulmïy 
inde… . 




The Tatar community is also concerned that the current education policies in Tatarstan might breed 
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mankurts (see “Background” part on Tatars). It is believed that if education in and of Tatar ceased in 
the villages, it would have negative consequences for the cultural upbringing of children and their 
language acquisition. 
Through these metapragmatic comments, Facebook users denaturalize the identities of those Tatars 
who speak Russian and those who are not sufficiently proficient in their native language. The derogative 
term mankurt implies that these people are victims of their environment due to their close coexistence 
with Russians, which made them forget their original national identity. 
Both of the ideologies discussed in this part, i.e., the “pure” Tatar of rural inhabitants and the ill 
language proficiency of mankurts, can be found in the metapragmatic discourses of many Tatar 
Facebook users, making this community more homogenized regarding the ideologies about “pure” 
language and “authentic” identity. Such homogeneity, we argue, is a result of the standardization 
processes that Tatar language has undergone—in contrast to Azerbaijani—in the course of the Soviet 
language management.  
 
Azerbaijani 
“Do not ruin ‘türkçe’!”. Example (12) illustrates the language policing practices of the Azerbaijani 
purists. It is a comment criticizing the language used in a poem, which was posted along with a picture 
on a Facebook page. In the previous section (Example 8), we illustrated the page adminis-trator’s 
response to this comment avoiding responsibility for the text (Bu görüntü bizə aid dəyil [This 545 
picture doesn’t belong to us]) and asserting that they only approved of its content. Now, let us see what 
was in fact criticized about this post: 
 
(12) yazıqlar olsun doğrudan … 
قاجالوا ق خوی خ  
ندرک زاب = قامچآ  
ندیرپ یزیچ یور زا = قامشآ  
نییامراپآ نادارآ ین ھچکروت افطول  
‘It is a shame/you should be ashamed, really … 
It should be ‘q’ not ‘x’ 
açmaq = to open (defined in Persian) 
aşmaq = to jump/cross over something (defined in Persian)  
Please, do not ruin Turkish.’ 
 
The focus of the criticism in this comment is the use of spoken form of the language in writing. It 
is particularly targeting the two different types of phonological alternations that are very common in 
the varieties of Azerbaijani spoken in Iran. Specifically, /q/ <ق>asinaçmaq < قامچآ >, is used in Standard 
North Azerbaijani and is therefore considered to be the underlying “correct” form. However, this form 
does not occur in particular environments in many of the Iranian Azerbaijani dialects. Instead, it is 
realized as/x/<خ> in word final and/or preconsonantal contexts, and as/ɣ/<غ> intervocalically. In 
addition, /ç/, which is pronounced as/t͡  ʃ/in Standard North Azerbaijani and Turkish and is realized as/t͡  
s/in many Iranian dialects, alternates with/ʃ/in word final and/or preconsonantal environments. As a 
result of these two phonological processes, the words for “to open” and “to jump/cross over something,” 
which are differentiated by this Facebook user, have become homophonic and are both pronounced 
as/aʃmax/. The poem that is being criticized here used the spoken form of the language (e.g., aşmax < 
خامشآ > to mean “to open”), which forced this Facebook user to react to the language use. Such use of 
language is in fact considered unacceptable and shameful by this Facebook user. In particular, s/he uses 
the expression yazıqlar olsun (also yaziklar olsun in Turkish) [It is a shame/you should be ashamed], 
which is not used in Iranian Azerbaijani, to state how “catastrophic” such language use is. Then, the 
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“correct” forms of the words are presented along with their Persian definitions to make a distinction 
between them. This is followed by a request not to ruin the language. Interestingly, the word used to 
refer to the language, i.e., Türkçe < ھچکروت >, is what is used in Turkish to refer to the Turkish language. 
This, in fact, points to the nationalistic, i.e., so-called pan-Turkic, ideology that there is a single 
“correct” form of the Turkic language that all Turks should use, one that is better maintained and is 
“purer” and “stronger” in Turkey and the Republic of Azerbaijan. While creating distinction from them, 
the useris also arguing that we are ruining it by such linguistic practices. This is what Karimzad (2018) 
refers to as self-subordination, a process in which the variety of the Azerbaijani we are speaking is 
devalued and instead the varieties spoken by other Turkic groups, specifically the Turkish and North 
Azerbaijanis, are elevated as “purer” and more “authentic.” 
 
“Speak your own mother tongue!”. Unlike the case of Tatar, in which the process of standardization 
has led to more homogenized ideologies of the Tatar language and identity, and the majority of Tatars 
agree with the purist practices, Iranian Azerbaijanis have developed more diverse attitudes toward these 
practices. While some people consider such language use as “pure” and “strong” Azerbaijani, others 
question the authenticity and legitimacy of these practices. The following example illustrates how such 
linguistic practices and their authenticity are challenged. 
 
یلید انآ (13) ! 
هداس خوچ خامزای ھنیلید انآ !ریید خامزای هدَلا وب لَا وا پییلِا جارخیتسیا رلتغول ھکِی ھکِی پینَجوگ یلید انآ ،موتسود زیزع مینم  
ید ! 
یدنیلید انآ نینس ،ناسیمشآ لید ،پیریدشیناد ننیرلتغول یسناھ ینس نانآ  
زملگ ھلَا تلاصا نانیغامد شیقلآ اغاملاچ ھیپچ ،ھمشوت اروز ،َتلشیا یرالنامھ  
ناسیشیناد ھجن اداجاب ھچوک !اد شیناد یویلید زوا نالوا.”َرلَگ یَب یلق ھسیدنیا“ !”…یک ریلگ ھلِب ھنم“ ریید پیلگ ھنم فرط  
؟ناسیلاس ندزوگ یووزوا ادکوبسیف ھین ھب !شیناد ینامھ ادادروب  
‘Mother tongue! 
My dear friend! Mother tongue is not about trying hard to extract “big” words from here and there 
and using them in writing. Writing in mother tongue is very simple. 
Through whatever words your mom has talked to you and you learned to speak, it is your mother 
tongue. 
Use the same [words]. Do not put yourself under pressure. Using ‘alqış’ [applaud] in North 
Azerbaijani) instead of ‘chæpih’ ([clap] in Iranian Azerbaijani) does not bring about “authenticity.” 
Some guy was telling me, “mənə belə gəlir ki …”! [It occurs to me that …] (North Azerbaijani 
structure) “indisi Quli bəygələr” [now Mr. Quli will come] In North Azerbaijani). Boy, speak your 
own language. Whatever language you speak out there (outside Internet), use the same language 
here [on Facebook]. Why are you making a fool out of yourself on Facebook?’ 
 
Through his/her metapragmatic comment, this Facebook user is criticizing the linguistic practices 
of the Azerbaijani purists on Facebook. S/he is specifically pointing to the lexical and morphosyntactic 
choices of the purists who claim they are trying to maintain their mother tongue, asserting that these 
words and structures do not belong to their mother tongue. S/he provides a definition for “mother 
tongue,” stating that their mother tongue is simply the language they have learned to speak as they were 
growing up and is not something people should search for. This is, in a sense, referring to the dominant 
discourses of the nationalists who identify themselves as “identity seekers” and claim authority to define 
Azerbaijani language and identity (Karimzad, 2018). This Facebook user is explicitly denaturalizing 
the authenticity of the identities that are being constructed through purist practices and also 
illegitimating the authority claimed by the purists. Finally, s/he points to the fact that these practices are 
not common outside of social media, and in fact, it is the social media that give them the opportunity to 
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In this article, we have examined the linguistic and metalinguistic practices of purism on Facebook. 
Focusing on the data coming from Tatar and Iranian Azerbaijani communities, we argue that 
purification practices, which deal with getting rid of foreign linguistic features, can be better understood 
as identity work. “Foreignness,” then, can be considered more of a socio-political construct rather than 
a result of mere linguistic differences. That is, “foreignness” of the linguistic features is determined 
based on whether they are associated with the language(s) of “them,” from whom the members of a 
community want to differentiate themselves. In turn, these foreign elements, regardless of their 
etymological roots, are replaced by the features associated with the language(s) of those with whom 
they want to adequate (Bucholtz & Hall, 630 2004a, 2004b, 2005). 
We also argued that Bucholtz and Hall’s(2004a, 2004b, 2005) tactics of intersubjectivity offer 
a helpful lens to examine purification practices, allowing us to see how new “iconic models” 
(Catedral, 2017;Irvine&Gal, 2000) are constructed, negotiated, and/or challenged. In the case 
of Tatar and Azerbaijani communities, we illustrated that, despite significant commonalities in the 
current position of their native languages vis-à-vis the hegemonic languages, their linguistic/semiotic 
practices of purification on Facebook have salient differences. While the Tatar community appears to 
have more homogeneous ideologies about what “pure” Tatar is and what constitutes Tatar identity, the 
practices observed among Azerbaijanis reveal more diverse understandings of these notions. We argued 
that such homogeneity and heterogeneity are largely due to the differences in the language policies in 
Iran and Russia. Unlike the Azerbaijani spoken in Iran, Tatar has an official status in Tatarstan and has 
gone through standardization processes. Standardization, as Bucholtz and Hall (2004a) argue, leads to 
“the imposition of a homogeneous national identity in which modern elites and speakers who once held 
traditional authority have very different roles” (p.386).It is The lack of such standardization in the 
Iranian Azerbaijani language that has led to diverse ideologies about mother tongue and identity among 
its speakers and can indeed explain the heterogeneity of their linguistic and metalinguistic practices of 
purification. 
Finally, we argued that, while practices of purification for minority language users are to a great 
extent limited to metapragmatic discourses in offline contexts, social media provides them with a unique 
venue to also practice their ideologies linguistically and semiotically. The speakers of Tatar and 
Azerbaijani rarely find the chance to exercise the written forms of their languages, since the majority 
languages are used in almost all formal situations; hence, social media becomes the only space for them 
to linguistically practice their ideologies of purism, giving them the chance to consciously 
monitor/select their linguistic choices. Also, while social media have been discussed more in terms of 
the informality of the linguistic forms utilized by their users, we illustrated how, given the sociopolitical 
and sociolinguistic circumstances of certain communities, they can indeed be used to practice what is 
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